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Abstract
The inverted U shape of the lifetime wage prole is frequently taken to be a stylized fact. This
implies a smooth decline in wages as workers approach retirement. Instead, this paper shows
that the hourly wage of the typical older worker increases slightly with age for as long as he is
employed full time. It declines discretely only when he enters partial retirement, a transitional
period characterized by the prevalence of part-time work, and remains mostly at thereafter.
That is, the wage path at older ages is best represented by a step function. The smoothly-
declining prole often found in the literature is the result of aggregation over individuals who
enter partial retirement at dierent ages. This conclusion is robust to controlling for self-selection
into partial and full retirement. More importantly, the transition out of full time work is a choice
for most workers, and the subsequent wage change is endogenously determined. While standard
labor supply models would rationalize the reduction in hours worked upon partial retirement
as a response to an exogenously declining wage trajectory, the evidence presented in the paper
indicates instead that workers choose to trade more leisure for a lower hourly wage in a context
in which a better paid, full-time job is available. In other words, wages and hours are jointly
determined at older ages. These ndings have important implications for the analysis of saving
and labor supply decisions over the life cycle.
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11 Introduction
The age-wage prole of a typical individual, also known as the deterministic or predictable com-
ponent of wages, is a key input in empirical labor and macroeconomic models. But what does
this prole look like? Labor supply studies generally assume it has an inverted U shape: wages
increase in the early stages of a worker's career, atten o in middle-age, and nally decline as
he approaches retirement. Indeed, the result that wage rates decline smoothly with age for older
workers is so ubiquitous in the literature that it is frequently taken to be a stylized fact.
This paper shows that there is no empirical evidence of wage declines at any age for full-time
male workers. On the contrary, the hourly wage of the typical man over age 50 increases slightly
with age for as long as he is employed full-time. The wage then drops discontinuously when the
worker transits into partial retirement -a state characterized by the prevalence of part-time work-,
and remains mostly at thereafter. Thus, the wage path at older ages is best represented by a
step-function. The smoothly-declining prole often found in the literature is a result of aggregation
over workers who transit into partial retirement at dierent ages.
Because models of life-cycle consumption and savings often use labor earnings, rather than
wages, as an input,1 the paper also studies the age-earnings prole. This is shown to have the same
step-function form as the wage prole, with a much more pronounced drop (73% vs. 32%) upon
partial retirement due to the simultaneous discrete change in hours worked.
As an additional contribution, the paper analyzes the nature of the transition into partial
retirement and its implications for labor supply modeling. I begin by showing that the nding
on the shape of the age-wage prole is not a result of self-selection. That is, the non-decreasing
wage path of full-time workers is not driven by individuals who experience negative wage shocks
choosing disproportionately to (partially) retire. Moreover, the transition out of the full-time job is
voluntary in the majority of cases. Altogether, the evidence points to workers who partially retire
choosing to trade more leisure for a lower hourly wage, rather than reducing hours in response to
an exogenously declining wage path that makes full-time work less attractive every year.
These results challenge the standard treatment of observed hours and wages in labor supply
studies. The canonical labor supply model assumes that a worker selects the number of hours
worked that maximizes utility for a given wage. The nding that workers choose to switch to a
part-time job in a context in which a higher-paid, full-time job is available suggests, instead, that
the typical worker faces a choice over a bundle of hours and wages. The appropriate approach to
modeling labor supply at older ages must incorporate the joint decision on the two variables.
The implications of these ndings are wide-ranging because key results in the labor and macro
literatures depend on the correct specication of the age-wage prole. For example, the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in labor supply (IES) is an important parameter for the study of
1This is a simplication intended to avoid modeling the labor supply decision.
2labor supply responses to business cycles and tax, private pension, or Social Security reform. The
estimation of this parameter using panel data relies crucially on the distinction between movements
along the life-cycle wage path and unanticipated changes that switch the prole itself. Incorrectly
assuming an exogenously declining wage prole at older ages will yield biased estimates of the IES
and consequently inaccurate policy predictions.2
The same is true for estimates of income uncertainty, which are key for the study of life-cycle
consumption and savings. It is common in this literature to approximate the predictable component
of earnings or wages as smoothly declining from the late 50's (see Hall and Mishkin [1982], Hubbard,
Skinner, and Zeldes [1994] or Floden and Lind e [2001]), and implicitly assume that deviations from
this path are the result of shocks. This approach leads to an overestimation of the labor income risk
facing older individuals if wages do not decline at older ages (as is the case for full-time workers)
or if declines are endogenously determined (as is the case upon partial retirement).
The wage prole is also a pivotal component of retirement models. Wages have a direct eect
in the retirement decision, in that they determine the relative value of work versus leisure. If
partial retirement is a choice for most workers, models that treat it as the optimal response to an
exogenously declining wage prole are misspecied. Retirement transitions driven by factors such as
the worker's taste for leisure or other nancial incentives, like private pensions and Social Security,
will be wrongly attributed to the anticipated decline in full-time wages. Expected wages also aect
the retirement decision indirectly, through their eect on pension accrual. Computations of present
discounted values of private pension and Social Security benets for nonretired individuals often
assume their wage follows a downward-sloping path (see Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise [2007]).
Finally, the shape of the wage prole is important for our understanding of the functioning of
the labor market. Dierent theories of wage determination have dierent implications concerning
the relationship between productivity and wages as the worker ages. The smoothly declining wage
prole is often justied on the grounds that it is consistent with the human capital model, which
predicts that wages of older workers will follow the declining path of productivity. The step-function
prole found in this paper can only be reconciled with the human capital model in two scenarios:
either productivity does not decline at older ages, or wage rigidities prevent adjustments to reect
productivity drops. On the other hand, the nding of a non-declining wage prole for full-time,
career workers is consistent with alternative wage theories such as Lazear's (1979) model of deferred
compensation.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on the age-wage prole.
Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis and provides some descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents estimates of observed age-wage proles that control for transitions into partial
2The Euler equation-based approach to the estimation of the IES, pioneered by MaCurdy (1981), is most sensitive
to an incorrect specications of the wage prole, as it rationalizes hours changes as responses to changes in observed
wages, taken as exogenous. The life-cycle approach in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), instead, can endogenize
discontinuous changes in hours as a choice between a better-paid full-time job and a lower-paid part-time job.
3retirement. Section 5 tests for bias in the observed proles resulting from non-random selection.
Section 6 discusses what proportion of partial and full retirements is voluntary, and section 7
concludes.
2 Overview
The standard labor supply model posits that participation and hours choices are a function of an
exogenous wage rate (Heckman [1993]). Not surprisingly given their key role, a large literature
exists on the study of wages. This literature has paid careful attention to wage uncertainty, but
comparatively less focus has been placed on age-wage proles, particularly as workers approach the
end of their careers.
Labor supply models generally assume an exogenous life-cycle wage path that peaks in middle
age and declines smoothly thereafter.3 However, despite its pervasiveness in the labor and macro
literature, the empirical evidence of a decreasing wage prole for older workers is plagued with
problems.
The justication for the assumed shape of the lifetime wage path dates back to the human
capital model (Becker [1993], Ben-Porath [1967], Mincer [1974]). The most basic version of this
model predicts that investment in human capital will dominate depreciation in the early years of
a worker's career, leading to increasing productivity. As he ages, the worker's incentives to invest
in human capital diminish. Thus, the slope of the productivity prole attens o with age and
eventually declines. If hourly wages are a direct translation of productivity, this gives rise to an
inverted U-shaped wage prole.
In the absence of depreciation, however, the productivity prole would just atten o but
never decline. Moreover, alternative theories of wage growth over the life cycle, such as models of
deferred-compensation, do not predict a close association between productivity and wages or, for
that matter, a declining wage prole for older workers. The shape of the lifetime wage path is,
therefore, an empirical question.
Most of the empirical research on wage proles dates back to a time when panel micro data
sets were not available. These cross-sectional studies nd wage declines that set in relatively early,
generally while workers are still in their 40's.4 But cross-sectional regressions characterize the
3Models that abstract from modeling labor supply assume that it is earnings, rather than hourly wages, that
decline at older ages. For the time being, it is useful to think as labor supply as xed, which makes the focus on
wages or earnings equivalent. The role of labor supply is introduced in section 4.2, which shows that the conclusions
of the paper apply to both wages and earnings.
4Lillard and Willis (1978), Mincer (1974) and Welch (1979) analyze earnings proles, which may overstate the
decline in wages if hours decrease too. Hurd (1971) studies wage proles and still nds that these peak in the
early 40's. For other examples see the survey by Willis (1985), where he states \Earnings functions [...] have been
estimated hundreds of times [...]. Almost all of the earnings function estimates that I have seen indicate a concave
log earnings-experience prole". Since the traditional earnings function does not control separately for age, a concave
experience prole implies a concave age prole for men, for whom actual and potential experience tend to be very
4average wage prole, which will be dierent from the individual wage prole in the presence of
cohort eects or composition eects. If, for instance, individuals born in later years have higher
wages, or those with higher education and better jobs retire earlier, the average wage prole will
decline more rapidly than the individual wage prole.5
The results from more recent longitudinal studies such as Honig and Hanoch (1985b) and
Johnson and Neumark (1996) suggest that cohort and composition eects are indeed responsible
for part of the downward trend in cross-sectional wage proles at older ages. But even after
controlling for those they nd signicant wage drops in their samples of older workers, even though
these are not apparent until workers are in their late 50's or early 60's.
Interestingly, both Honig and Hanoch and Johnson and Neumark nd sharp wage declines
around the Social Security ages. This is signicant because many men reduce their hours of work in
those years, possibly as a response to incentives from the Social Security rules (Aaronson and French
[2004]). Indeed, part-time work is a common phenomenon at older ages. The retirement literature
has shown that the majority of workers do not transit directly into inactivity after leaving their
long-term, career job. Instead, they go through a transitional period of partial retirement, generally
working part-time, often outside their former industry and occupation.6 There are many reasons
to expect hourly wages to decline upon partial retirement. First, part-time workers may suer an
hourly-wage penalty with respect to full-time workers in similar jobs. Second, the transition into
partial retirement often involves a change of employer and job characteristics, with the consequent
loss of job-specic skills. These job changes are sometimes motivated by lack of exibility of their
former employer, who may not accommodate part-time work. Other times workers actively search
for less demanding jobs, which they see as part of a gradual transition into full retirement.
Put together, this evidence suggests that part of the decline in the individual wage prole is
likely due to transitions out of full-time jobs. To my knowledge, only Gustman and Steinmeier
(1985) have estimated wage equations controlling for partial retirement status. They nd that even
though the transition out of the full time job is indeed associated with a signicant wage drop, the
wage prole of non-retired workers is still decreasing at older ages. But their OLS estimates do
not control for cohort and composition eects which, as mentioned above, have been shown to be
important in this context.
In order to address the issues highlighted in this section, the rst part of this paper is concerned
with the estimation of the wage prole of nonretired workers. Having established that this is slightly
increasing, and that wage declines at older ages are fully explained by the transition into partial
close at older ages.
5The individual wage prole obtained from xed eects regressions is not aected by composition eects as long
as the characteristics associated to earlier transitions into retirement are xed (e.g. education, type of pension plan,
etc.). This prole may, however, still be biased as a result of selection on unobservables. This possibility is explored
in section 5.
6See Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn (2005), Gustman and Steinmeier (1985), Honig and Hanoch (1985a), Quinn
(1997), and Ruhm (1990 and 1995) for a detailed description of the retirement process and its evolution over time.
5retirement, the second part of the paper examines the nature of this transition. First, it will be
shown that it is not driven by non-random selection into retirement, whereby workers who receive
negative wage shocks choose disproportionately to leave their full-time job. Second, I provide
evidence that the majority of transitions into partial and full retirement are voluntary.
The voluntary nature of most retirements is key to understanding the implications of the paper.
The fact that most workers choose to leave their full-time job when they could have kept it is of
major signicance for the modeling of labor supply at older ages. It shows that individuals do not
face one exogenous wage rate. Instead, hours and wages are determined jointly, as the results of a
choice between a full-time job with a higher wage rate, and a part-time job with a lower one.7
In this sense, this paper is also related to the literature that has questioned the assumption that
workers have exibility in choosing hours, and provided evidence that wages and hours are tied
together (See Mot [1984], Altonji and Paxson [1988, 1992] and Blundell, Brewer and Francesconi
[2008], among others). These papers focus on younger workers. Given the substantive evidence
indicating that older workers, for the most part, want to retire gradually (see Siegenthaler and
Brenner [2001] for a review of this evidence), the lack of exibility in hours choices is likely particu-
larly binding for them. Modeling transitions into partial retirement as a response to an exogenous
decline in wages misrepresents the constraints faced by older workers. Most of them choose to leave
their full-time job and forego the higher wage even when they could have kept it, for reasons that
a correctly-specied labor supply model needs to capture.
3 Data
The data used in the empirical analysis come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
panel dataset of adults over 50 years of age. These are complemented with cross-sectional data
from the 1990 US Census 5% Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS), which covers workers of all ages,
wherever full life-cycle proles are shown.8
In order to work with a homogeneous sample, the analysis is restricted to men born between
the years 1931 and 1941. The majority of these individuals enter the sample in the rst wave,
corresponding to the year 1992, and are subsequently interviewed every two years. I use the 9
survey waves that are currently available, spanning from 1992 to 2008.
There are 4,856 HRS respondents who were born during the period of interest. 1,089 of those
are already fully retired by the time they become HRS respondents. As there is no information on
7This argument assumes that workers cannot work part-time and maintain the higher, full-time wage rate. There
is ample evidence in the literature that this is indeed the case for older workers. Gustman and Steinmeier (1985)
provide evidence on minimum hours constraints in career jobs from the PSID. More recently, Hurd (1996) argues
that employers are often unable or unwilling to accommodate exible hours, forcing workers to move to leave their
career job if they want to reduce the number of hour worked.
8For a description of the HRS dataset, see HRS \RAND HRS Data, Version J" (2010). For the Census PUMS,
see Ruggles et al. (2010).
6wages for these individuals, they must be excluded from the analysis. It is therefore important to
understand the characteristics of this group. Not surprisingly, they are slightly older when they
become HRS respondents than the sample of workers (57.28 vs 55.86 years old, on average). In
terms of the reasons that may have led them to retire, they are somewhat heterogeneous, and can
be broadly divided in three groups: 33% of them are receiving disability insurance, 27% are in bad
health but not receiving disability, and 40% of them are in good health.9 Those receiving disability
are the poorest (24k median total household wealth10), followed by those in bad health but not
disabled (44k) and those in good health (136k). For comparison, median total household wealth
for the sample of workers is 90k. These gures suggest that those in good health are likely to have
had good jobs with access to private pension plans that allowed them to retire early, while those
in bad health or disabled may have had to exit the work force for health reasons. In terms of the
eect of excluding these workers on the interpretation of the nal results, it is important to bear
in mind that the number of disability insurance recipients more than doubles (up to 17%) before
age 60, so this form of retirement is not excluded from the sample in the main analysis.
Workers who are self-employed when rst observed in the HRS panel (762) are excluded from
the nal sample, as well as those with hourly wages below $3 or over $40, and those for whom only
one wage observation is available. The remaining sample consists of 2,253 individuals.
The dependent variable analyzed in the following section is the (hourly) Wage Rate. Figure 1
shows the average wage proles from the HRS and Census (the left panel spans the whole life cycle,
while the right one covers only the years for which information from both data sources is available).
The Census series has the well-known inverted U shape. Average wages increase with age for young
workers, atten o from the early 40's and decline from the early 50's. HRS observations span the
period of declining hourly wages. The two series do not overlap for two reasons: rst, the Census
hourly wage rate needs to be recovered from yearly wage earnings, which include commissions, cash
bonuses, tips, and income from secondary jobs. The HRS variable, instead, measures directly the
hourly wage rate at the primary job. Second, the Census series is a cross-section, while the HRS
one uses pooled observations for individuals born between 1931 to 1941 at all ages. This implies
that as we move towards older ages the Census series should be more aected by cohort eects.
Despite these dierences, the rate of wage decline is remarkably similar in the two series.
The other key variable in the empirical analysis is participation status, which is dened based
on the variable Hours of work per week at current job. Workers are classied as working full-time
if they work more than 30 hours per week, and as working part-time if they work up to 30 hours
per week.11 The left panel of gure 2 shows life cycle participation proles from the Census. Two
9The proportion of disabled workers implies that 7.4% of the incoming HRS sample has retired through disability,
which corresponds fairly closely to the 7% of the total workforce aged 50 to 54 receiving disability benets in 2009
(Milligan [forthcoming]).
10All nancial variables are expressed in 1992 $.
11Using dierent denitions of full-time work, part-time work and inactivity, such as classifying as full-time workers
those who work more than 35 and considering those who work less than 2 or 5 hours per week as inactive, does not
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NOTE. - All gures in 1992 dollars. Hourly wages lower than $3 per hour and higher than $40 per hour excluded.
main trends are noteworthy: On the one hand, total participation rates start declining at the same
time as average hourly wages. On the other hand, full-time work decreases more rapidly than
overall participation, while part-time work increases from the early 50's. Thus, the full-time versus
part-time composition of the work force changes radically between ages 50 and 70.
Finally, the right panel of gure 2 shows participation rates in the HRS. The changing propor-
tions of full-time and part-time workers in the total workforce are apparent. The only dierence
with the Census is that full-time work declines slightly more rapidly relatively to part-time work
in the HRS, reecting a secular trend towards partial retirement (Ruhm [1995]).
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A worker's participation status is used to dene partial retirement. An individual becomes
aect the results.
8partially-retired whenever he is rst observed working part-time or he rst becomes self-employed.
The decision to keep in the sample full-time workers who only become self-employed when they
approach retirement follows substantive evidence that self-employment is an important route into
partial retirement in the US (Maestas and Zissimopoulos [2010]). Dropping the self-employed from
the sample does not aect the nal results substantively, and indeed makes the eect of partial
retirement on wages slightly stronger.
Partial retirement is an absorbing state, that is, partially retired individuals who go back into
full-time work do not recover their \non-retired" status, as these so-called \reverse retirements" or
\unretirements" are unlikely to imply a return to a career job.
4 Observed Proles
4.1 Age-Wage Proles
Denote by wit the log hourly wage of individual i in period t. As is customary in the literature,
the following linear specication is assumed for wages:
wit = W(Ageit) + Xit + uit; (4.1)
where W is some function of age, Xit a vector of other observable characteristics, and the error
term uit is potentially serially correlated and/or correlated with the observables.
Equation 4.1 can be interpreted as a standard Mincerian regression where hourly wages, rather
than earnings, are used as the dependent variable to avoid confounding wage and labor supply
eects. The roles of education and experience are not made explicit here to maintain the focus on
age, but both are implicit in the regression: education will be captured by the xed eect, while
experience is embedded in the age eect.
I begin by estimating equation (4.1) following the conventional approach of using all available
wage observations, without distinguishing between those of non-retired and partially retired work-
ers. The second column of table 1 reports xed eects coecient estimates from this regression (for
comparison, pooled OLS estimates are also shown on the rst column). The age prole implied
by these results, displayed as the dashed line in gure 3, is clearly decreasing from the late 50's
onwards. As the slope changes around this age, I run two separate joint signicance tests. The
p-values, shown at the bottom of table 1, show no signicant change in wages from ages 51 to 57,
but a strongly signicant decline from ages 58 to 69.
The results just presented come from a sample that includes partially retired workers. There are
a number of reasons why their wage rates may be lower than those of full-time workers, including
lower hourly wages for part-time work and dierences in job characteristics if they move to jobs
that require less eort or responsibility. As the proportion of partially-retired workers in the
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sample increases tenfold from ages 55 to 65, failure to control for this composition change may be
problematic.
To capture this, I re-estimate equation 4.1 adding as an additional regressor an indicator that the
individual has entered partial retirement. Since this is an absorbing state, its coecient is identied
from individuals who switch from full-time work. Estimates from this regression, reported in the
third column of table 1, show that entrance into partial-retirement is associated with a 32% decline
in hourly wages. This result is consistent with Aaronson and French (2004), who nd a 25% wage
drop for individuals who change their labor supply from 40 to 20 hours per week upon becoming 62
and 65, although the eect of partial retirement captured here is more general, and not conned to
the Social Security ages. More importantly, the wage prole obtained after controlling for partial
retirement -shown on the solid line in gure 3- no longer declines with age: Joint signicance tests
show a slight increase in wages until age 57, and no signicant change thereafter.
The implication of this result is that the individual age-wage prole is mostly at or slightly
increasing for workers over age 50 who remain employed full time, declining discretely only at the
point of entry into partial retirement. This is illustrated in gure 4, which shows, as an example,
the predicted wage prole for an individual who transit into partial retirement at age 55, on the
left, and at age 62, on the right, using the coecients from the last regression. It is clear that
these step-function proles are very dierent from the smoothly declining one obtained from the
regression that did not control for retirement status. That prole was a result of aggregation over
individuals who transit into partial retirement at dierent ages.
The eect of aggregation can also be illustrated using the results of separate regressions for
the subsample of non-retired workers (which yields the full-time prole, shown on the left series in
gure 5) and that of partially-retired workers (the part-time prole, shown on the right series in
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gure 5). Joint signicance tests provide no evidence of wage declines for full-time workers, and
slight but signicant declines for partially-retired workers, which are likely explained by further job
changes for those already retired. Failure to control for transitions into partial retirement in wage
regressions yields a weighted average of these two proles. As we move towards older ages, partial
retirement becomes relatively more likely, and hence the weight on the part-time prole increases.
As a result, the average wage prole decreases with age.
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114.2 Age-Earnings Proles
Life-cycle models of consumption and savings often avoid modeling the labor supply decision explic-
itly and take the labor earnings process, rather than hourly wages, as exogenous. They regularly
assume that labor earnings of older workers decline smoothly with age. But as earnings are partly
determined by the hourly wage rate, the results in the previous section imply that they must also
drop discretely upon entrance into partial-retirement. And since, by denition, this transition is
associated with a reduction in hours, the discrete drop in earnings is likely even more pronounced
than that in wages. The results presented above regarding the shape of the wage prole are not
enough, though, to infer the shape of the earnings prole of full-time workers, which will depend on
whether the adjustment in hours worked begins before the transition into partial retirement. This
section investigates this point, and characterizes the shape of the labor earnings prole of older
workers.
The biennial nature of the HRS survey results in a mismatch between the labor supply and
labor earnings variables. At each interview, individuals are asked about their current work status
and their earnings for the preceding calendar year. As a result, information on the number of hours
worked is available for the interview years only. Earnings information, meanwhile, is available for
the intervening years, during which it is not possible to determine which individuals are partially
retired. Therefore I do not use reported labor earnings in the analysis, and instead construct a
contemporaneous measure of weekly earnings combining information on hourly wages and hours of
work per week at the current job. Results for wages have already been presented in the previous
section. Here I rst analyze the hours prole, and then discuss the implications for the earnings
prole.
To study the prole of weekly hours I estimate equations of the same form as 4.1 using log
hours as the dependent variable. The regression coecients are shown in table 2, and the implied
age proles (in levels) are plotted in gure 6.
As before, I start by estimating the hours prole using all available observations, without
controls for retirement status. Fixed-eects estimates are presented on the second column of table
2 (OLS estimates are shown in column 1 for comparison). The coecients from this regression show
a steeply declining hours prole that drops by more than 42% (in levels) from ages 51 to 69. There
are very signicant drops in hours (9.5 and 7.6%, respectively) at ages 62 and 63, conrming workers'
tendency to reduce hours at the Social Security's early retirement age, as shown in Aaronson and
French (2004). The average number of hours worked diminishes very slightly (by 2.3%) between
ages 51 and 57, but the age dummies for these years are not jointly signicant at 5%. The bulk
of the decline in hours takes place between ages 58 and 69. Hours go down by 40% in this period,
and the corresponding age dummies are strongly jointly signicant.
To understand what proportion of the downward trend in hours is due to transitions into partial
retirement, as opposed to adjustments within the full-time job, I add to the xed eects regression
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an indicator that the individual is partially retired. As shown on the third column of table 2,
the coecient on this variable is strongly signicant, and implies a 60% drop in hours upon exit
from the full-time job. Once we control for the transition into partial retirement, the age dummies
around the Social Security ages are no longer signicant and their coecients shrink in magnitude,
indicating that they were capturing outows from full-time jobs in the previous regression. The
resulting age prole is now slightly upward-sloping from ages 51 to 57, and slightly downward-
sloping thereafter, providing some evidence of hours adjustments in anticipation of retirement.
The overall decline in hours from age 51 to age 69 is reduced to 11%, and most of it results from
the large (but not signicant) negative coecient on the dummy for age 69. In other words, 76%
of the change in hours between ages 51 and 69 (and 96% between 51 and 68) is explained by the
transition into partial retirement.
Figure 7 shows predicted hours proles for a hypothetical individual who transits into partial
retirement at age 55 (left) and one who does so at age 62 (right), constructed using the coecients
from the last regression. The hours prole has the same step-function shape as the wage prole. It
is essentially at for full-time workers and drops discretely with the switch into partial retirement.
Further hours adjustments in the following years are comparatively minor. As was the case for
wages, the smooth hours prole often reported in the literature is a result of aggregation of non-
retired and partially retired workers.
Finally, the results for wages and hours can be combined to oer some insight on the shape
of the earnings prole. Figure 8 shows predicted weekly earnings proles for an individual who
transits into partial retirement at ages 55 and 62, respectively. Not surprisingly, as weekly earnings
are obtained as the product of the wage and hours proles shown above, the earnings prole is also
a step function. This analysis misses some standard components of labor earnings, such as bonuses,
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tips, or income from secondary jobs. It is conceivable that these may be adjusted before partial
retirement. However, in view of the evidence in gure 8, it seems safe to conclude that the drop
in earnings upon entrance into partial retirement accounts for the vast majority of the decline in
earnings at older ages.
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5 Testing for Selection Eects
It follows from the analysis in the previous section that the observed wage prole is slightly increas-
ing for non-retired workers. This nding appears to be inconsistent with a model where productivity
declines slowly with age and wages reect worker productivity. But the shape of the observed prole
could be a result of selection on unobservables. Suppose that productivity is stochastic and follows
14a downward trend with age. Every year, only workers who receive positive productivity shocks
keep their full-time jobs, while the rest transit into partial or full retirement. In this scenario, the
observed full-time wage prole understates the decline in wages with age.
This section provides evidence to show that the at full-time wage prole is not driven by
non-random selection into retirement. The least parametric evidence comes from the xed eects
regressions in the previous section. As shown on the second column of table 1, the wage prole
obtained from the regression mixing full-time and part-time observations declines at age 62 by
almost 4 percent. 62 is the age at which individuals become eligible for Social Security benets,
and it has been found to be associated with a pronounced spike in the retirement hazard.12 If wage
declines are partly explained by switches from full-time work into partial retirement, we would
expect to nd a drop in wages at this age. Tellingly, the wage drop at 62 disappears completely
once the control for partial retirement is introduced. If transitions into partial retirement at this
age are largely motivated by exogenous institutional features, this result indicates that the most
noticeable decline in wages at older ages is not driven by self-selection.13
Next, I provide more formal evidence of lack of selectivity by performing the selection test
proposed by Wooldridge (1995 and 2002), which extends Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure to
a panel-data context. The tradeo for the added formality is a stronger reliance on functional form
assumptions.
I consider two alternative specications for the selection process. In the rst one, I group partial
retirement and full retirement together, and model the selection rule as a choice between working
full time and not working full-time, with full-time wages observed only in the former case. In the
second one, I consider a selection rule based on two separate indices, equal to 1 if the individual
is partially and fully retired, respectively. Full-time wages are observed whenever both indices are
equal to 0. This specication allows for observables to aect dierentially the decisions to partially
and fully retire, in line with the retirement literature that characterizes the two as separate statuses
(Honig and Hanoch [1985a]).
In the single-index case, selection is determined by the following equation:
sR
it = I[Zit +  Zi + vit > 0]; (5.1)
where vitjZi has a standard normal distribution, sR
it is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is
retired (either partially or fully), Zit is a vector of observables and  Zi a vector of within-individual
averages dened as follows:  Zi  1
Ti
PTi
j=1 Zit, with Ti equal to the number of periods that individual
i is observed in the panel. Equation 5.1 can be viewed as the reduced form of a selection equation
12The retirement literature has suggested dierent motives that would explain the spike of retirements at age 62,
ranging from liquidity constraints that would be lifted by the Social Security pension, to work disincentives from the
Social Security's earnings test, to framing eects.
13A similar argument applies to age 59, when dened-contribution pension holders can rst access their pension.
15with an unobserved, time-constant individual eect which is specied as a correlated random eect
(as in Chamberlain [1980]), and where  Zi is intended to capture its correlation with observables.
The vector Zit includes age dummies, all other observables that enter the wage equation, plus some
exclusion restrictions.  Zi includes, on top of the time averages of Zit, time-invariant regressors such
as education.
The selection equation is estimated by probit regression, and the results are used to generate the
inverse Mills ratio, ^ R
it, which is then added to equation 4.1 as an additional regressor. Wooldridge
(1995) shows that a valid test of the null hypothesis of no selection is a t-statistic on the coecient
of ^ R
it in the xed eects estimation of equation 4.1.14
In the multiple-index case, two selection equations of the same form as 5.1 characterize, respec-
tively, the decisions to partially and fully retire:
sPR
it = I[Zit1 +  Zi1 + vit1 > 0]
sFR
it = I[Zit2 +  Zi2 + vit2 > 0]; (5.2)
with vit1 and vit2 jointly normal conditional on Zi. 5.2 is estimated by multinomial probit. Under
the assumption of independent idiosyncratic error terms in the partial and full retirement equations,
the two inverse Mills ratios ^ PR
it and ^ FR
it can be added to the wage equation separately to perform
the selection test.
First-stage results.
Coecients from the rst-stage regressions are shown on table A.1 in the table appendix. For
ease of interpretation, average marginal eects are also reported in table 3. I consider dierent
exclusion restrictions. Column (1) shows results from a specication where an indicator that the
individual has a health condition that limits his ability to work is used as an exclusion restriction.
Recall that the within-individual average of the health limitation variable enters the regression as
part of the vector  Zi. Hence the exclusion restriction captures the eect of deviations from average
health. This exclusion restriction is valid if these health changes do not aect wages, either because
they do not inuence productivity, or because employers face restrictions to reduce wages of sick
workers.
The specication in column (2) considers household wealth as an alternative exclusion restric-
tion.15 The validity of this variable as an exclusion restriction has been questioned in the context of
Heckman-type selection models of female labor supply, as it is likely correlated with workers' past
14No functional form assumption is required on the joint distribution of uit and vit in this context where we only
aim to test for sample selection. The standard joint normality assumption is only required in this framework in order
to correct for sample selection, once this has been detected.
15Health limitations are included as explanatory variables in this specication, but they are not used as exclusion
restrictions -i.e. they are entered as regressors in the second stage too.
16participation decisions and, hence, their attachment to the labor force and current wages. In the
panel framework, however, we can control for average wealth over the sample period, to capture the
correlation between lifetime wealth and the xed individual component. The exclusion restriction
is the deviation of current wealth from average wealth, which is arguably more exogenous.
In column (3) of table 3 I consider two exclusion restrictions that have been previously used
in retirement studies to proxy for exogenous changes in labor force participation at older ages,
namely indicators that the individual is over age 62 and over age 65. These are, respectively, the
Social Security early and full retirement ages. Large retirement spikes at these ages have been
amply documented in the literature. These are likely the most plausible exclusion restrictions,
as they are part of the regulatory framework and independent of individual characteristics. The
drawback is that, if they are to be excluded from the wage equation, these age dummies cannot
be used to represent the age-wage prole. Therefore the second stage from this specication will
make the assumption that the wage prole is well approximated by a smooth polynomial in age.
Participation must also change smoothly with age, except for the institutionally-induced discrete
jumps at ages 62 and 65.
The specication shown in column (4) considers the same exclusion restrictions as (3), but it
allows for selection on two margins, namely partial and full retirement. The eects of observables
on each form of retirement are reported separately.
As can be seen on the second panel of table A.1, all exclusion restrictions are strongly signicant
and of the anticipated sign. In column (2), the coecients on both current wealth and current
wealth squared are statistically signicant, indicating a concave relationship between deviations
from average wealth and retirement. The marginal eects for the exclusion restrictions are reported
in the second panel of table 3. In column (1), having a health limitation is associated, on average,
with a 14 percentage-point increase in the probability of retirement. In the second specication,
a $100k increase in wealth raises the average probability of retirement by 1.5 percentage points.
Results from the third specication show that exits from full-time jobs increase by 13 percentage
points for workers above age 62, and by 4 percentage points for those above 65. Comparing these
results with those in column (4) we can see that crossing the Social Security retirement ages is
strongly associated with transitions into full retirement, but the marginal eects are not signicant
in the partial retirement equation.
The main time-varying regressor is age, which, not surprisingly, turns out to be a key deter-
minant of retirement decisions in all specications. From columns (1) to (3) in table 3 we can see
that the full-time participation prole declines steeply as workers age, while column (4) shows that
there are no dierential inows into partial and full retirement with age.
The marginal eects for the variables proxying for the individual eect are shown on the third
panel of table 3. Average age has a negative and strongly signicant eect on retirement, indicating
that later-born workers (who, given the design of the HRS panel, enter the sample at younger ages,
17and hence have a lower average age) are more likely to enter retirement at every age. This reects
a secular trend into early retirement, and shows that even in a narrowly-dened sample in terms
of year of birth there is scope for cohort eects. Not surprisingly, the lower an individual's health
type -proxied by the average number of periods he has a health condition that limits work-, the
higher the likelihood that he will stop working full-time, and we can see from column (4) that both
current and average health predict entrances into full retirement more strongly than those into
partial retirement.
Dened contribution (DC) pension-holders are less likely to enter any form of retirement. Those
with a dened benet (DB) pension plan are also less likely to partially retire than individuals
without a pension plan, but the marginal eect of the DB pension indicator is not signicant in
the full retirement equation. Columns (1) to (3) of table 3 show no signicant eect of education
on full-time participation, but we can see in column (4) that this is masking a dierential eect on
the two forms of retirement: college-educated individuals are 4 percentage points more likely to be
partially retired, and 5 percentage points less likely to be fully retired, than individuals who have
not nished high-school. For high school graduates the signs of the marginal eects are the same,
but they are not statistically signicant. The mother's education level, which is intended to proxy
for the worker's ability, is not signicant in the single-index specications, but it is associated with
a higher likelihood of both types of retirement in the multiple-index one.
Second-stage results.
Results for the second stage are presented in table 4. The coecients on the estimated inverse
Mills ratio in specications (1) to (3) are very close to zero and not signicant. The null hypothesis
of no selection bias cannot be rejected in any of the three cases. In specication (4), the coecient
on the inverse Mills ratio from the full retirement selection equation is positive, while the one from
the partial retirement equation is negative. However, none of the coecients is signicant. The
p-values from individual t-tests on each Mills ratio are, respectively, 0.41 and 0.29. The p-value
from a joint test of signicance is 0.55. Once more, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
selection on unobservables.
After the introduction of the inverse Mills ratios in the wage regressions, the age proles remain
very close to those presented in section 4. The age dummies in the rst two specications indicate a
slightly increasing wage prole in the early 50's, with no signicant changes thereafter (the p-value
for the joint signicance test of the ages dummies from years 58 to 69 is 0.21 in the rst column and
0.24 in the second one). The last two columns approximate the age-wage prole with a quadratic
polynomial. The age coecients are signicant, indicating a concave prole, which results from the
initial increase and subsequent attening of hourly wages. The overall wage decline for workers in
their 60's, even under this restrictive functional form, is very small. Finally, there is no signicant
eect of current wealth and health limitations on wages. The latter result is consistent with French
(2005), who also nds little evidence of wage dierences by health status.
186 Is (partial) retirement a choice?
Having established that wages and earnings decline signicantly only when workers transit into
partial retirement, this section focuses on the nature of this transition. Are most exits from full-
time jobs the result of events outside the worker's control, such as layos or disabling health
conditions? Or do workers retire for reasons mostly unrelated to wages, such as pension incentives
or a willingness to enjoy more leisure, even when they could have remained employed at their former
wage rate?
The implications of the ndings in this paper regarding the shape of the wage path depend
crucially on the answers to these questions. To see why, suppose for simplicity that full retirement
is not an option and workers are observed either in full-time or part-time jobs, with lower average
wages in the latter case. If most exits from full-time jobs are involuntary, the subsequent wage drop
is exogenous from the worker's perspective. The drop in hours can be rationalized in the context
of the canonical labor supply model as an optimal response to the exogenous wage change. In this
scenario, the usual modeling assumptions hold, and only the smoothly-declining wage prole needs
to be substituted by a step-function prole, with uncertainty regarding the timing of the transition
from full-time work.
If, on the other hand, most exits from full-time jobs are voluntary, then observed wages of
partially-retired workers are not a good proxy for oered wages, to the extent that they could have
kept their full-time job, had they chosen to. In this case, the appropriate approach to modeling
labor supply must recognize that the worker faces a joint choice of wage rate and hours: he can
work full time for an hourly wage w, or work part-time for a lower hourly rate.
The last scenario calls into question the conclusions of models that estimate an exogenous wage
process for older workers from observed wages, and rationalize hours choices as an optimal response
to a given wage rate. In particular, ignoring the joint choice of wages and hours at older ages will
yield biased estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor supply (as shown by
Chang, Kim, Kwon and Rogerson [2001]), and consequently unreliable estimates of labor supply
responses to business cycles and reforms of the tax system, private pensions or Social Security.
Models of income dynamics will overstate the risk facing workers if wage drops at older ages are
assumed exogenous when they are not. This can aect our understanding of individuals' responses
to risk and the assessment of welfare eects of social insurance programs intended to reduce this
risk.16 Retirement models will attribute too many full-time work exits to exogenously declining
wages, in detriment of pension incentives or a preference for leisure (as shown by Gustman and
Steinmeier [1986]).
Establishing the extent to which partial and full retirements are voluntary is not an easy task,
since such pivotal decisions in a worker's lifetime are likely inuenced by a myriad of motives. This
16See Cunha, Heckman and Navarro (2005) and Low, Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) for a discussion of the importance
of the distinction between forecastable changes in wages or income from those that are the result of exogenous shocks.
19is clear from the rst-stage regressions in section 5, which provide an overview of the main variables
that correlate with full-time work exits. Some of those, like lifetime wealth or the type of pension
plan, hint at voluntary retirements that respond to incentives that are independent from wages
or productivity changes. Others, such as the onset of a health condition that limits work, suggest
that some retirements are triggered by factors outside the individual's control. This section reviews
several pieces of evidence that, on the whole, point to a majority of retirements being voluntary
decisions of workers who had the choice to remain in their full-time jobs.
Evidence from individual self-reports is presented in Szinovacz and Davey (2005), who analyze
HRS questions asking respondents whether their decision to retire was voluntary. They nd that 70
percent of male respondents perceive their retirement as \wanted". The remaining 30% is likely an
upper bound on retirements that respond to health or work-related reasons such as wage decreases
or layos, as some workers in the \forced" category report having to leave their jobs to care for
their spouses, parents or grandchildren. In a typical retirement model, any of those reasons would
be modeled as a choice resulting from the worker's comparison of foregone wages versus the cost of
private care.
At the same time, some individuals may report that they have retired voluntarily whenever they
had a choice to keep their full-time job, even if that would have resulted in a wage cut. Schultz,
Morton and Weckerle (1998) investigate this possibility using a sample of early retirees from the
HRS out which roughly 30% (70%) report having retired involuntarily (voluntarily). They nd
that involuntary retirees often cite poor health as the most inuential factor driving their decision
to retire, whereas for voluntary ones it almost always responds to their desire to \do other things"
or lack of a need to work \based on adequate nances".
Apart from their subjective perceptions, HRS respondents are also asked about the specic
reasons why they left their last employer. This question is asked to every person who changes jobs
between waves, independently of their retirement status. I analyze the responses to this question
in table 5. Out of all possible reasons for retirement, the ones shown on the rst three rows (the
business where the individual was working closed, he was laid o, or he was in bad health or became
disabled) are most likely associated with an involuntary retirement. The remaining categories (the
worker retired, had care obligations, needed to move with the spouse, etc.) are likely indicative of
a voluntary retirement.
The rst two columns of the table show responses of workers who have just transited from full-
time work into full-retirement and partial retirement, respectively. Roughly 15% of these workers
report having left the full-time job because the business closed or they were laid o. Being in poor
health or disabled is a more frequent response for those who fully retired (16%) than those partially
retired (4%), consistent with the results from the selection equations in the previous section. In both
cases, the most frequent reason given for the recent job exit is that the worker retired (62 and 55%).
Since this answer is so prevalent, table 6 probes further into the reasons behind it. All workers who
20report having changed jobs because they \retired" are asked whether this was following a change
in employment conditions and, if so, of what type. As can be seen in the rst two columns of table
6, the overwhelming majority of fully and partially retired workers report having retired following
either no change in their employment conditions (80 and 75%, respectively), or a positive change,
such as becoming eligible for a pension or an early retirement incentive (5 and 9%). Virtually none
of these workers reports changes in their employment conditions suggesting an exogenous change
in wages or in employment availability.
Finally, for comparison, the last two columns of table 5 report the reasons for job changes of
workers who moved from full-time to full-time jobs, and of those who changed jobs but had already
retired in the past. None of these workers counts as a transition into partial retirement in my
sample. Workers switching between full-time jobs are most likely to report exogenous changes in
their working conditions, such a lay-o or business closure (43%), and much less likely to indicate
that they have retired (14.23%). Workers who were already partially retired and change jobs give
answers that are very close to those reported in column 1, suggesting that these transitions are
mostly capturing switches from a part-time job into full-retirement.
To conclude, the evidence presented in this section strongly points to a large proportion of
career job exits being voluntary. The number of involuntary retirements, up to 30% of the total, is
not negligible, and points to the key role of uncertainty in the working decision of older workers.
However, at least 70% of full retirements and 80% of partial retirements are the result of choice.
This implies that in a majority of cases the wage drop following transitions into partial retirement
is endogenous.
7 Conclusions
This paper shows that the wage prole of the typical older individual is best represented by a
step function: wages are at or slightly increasing with age for as long as the worker is employed
full-time. They drop discretely when he leaves the career job, and remain mostly at thereafter.
More importantly, the wage change at the transition into partial retirement is endogenous in most
cases, as workers choose when to start the gradual transition into retirement.
The paper challenges three common assumptions in the empirical literature. First, that wages
decline slowly with age for individuals approaching retirement, following the path of productivity.
Second, that observed wages are a good proxy for oered wages in the sample of employed individ-
uals. Third, that hours are a response to exogenous changes in wages. The results indicate that,
at least at older ages, wages and hours are determined jointly, as the result of a choice between a
bundle involving full-time hours and high wages, and one involving part-time hours and a lower
wage rate.
The conclusions of the paper are relevant to empirical labor and macro models whose conclusions
21depend on the correct specication of the lifetime wage or earnings proles. This type of models
is used in very dierent contexts, including the analysis of labor supply changes over the business
cycle, labor supply responses to tax or pension changes, the role of uncertainty in individual choices,
and retirement decisions.
Finally, the conclusions of the paper are not incompatible with the prediction from the human
capital model of a close association between wages and productivity. However, I nd no evidence
of downward wage adjustments for as long as workers are employed full-time, or of less productive
workers being forced to leave their full-time jobs (with the exception of those who suer the onset
of health conditions). The ndings presented here are consistent with the human capital model
if productivity does not start declining before workers partially retire. On the other hand, they
are also consistent with alternative theories of wage determination that do not predict a close
association between productivity and wages, such as some eciency wage models.
Author's aliation:
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), Department of Economics.
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26Table 1: Age-Wage Prole from Dierent Specications
Dependent Variable
wit wit wit wFT
it wPT
it
OLS FE FE FE FE
PR=1 -0.321**
(0.021)
age52 0.005 0.032 0.032 0.035
(0.035) (0.028) (0.027) (0.023)
age53 -0.022 0.001 0.008 0.003
(0.030) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019)
age54 0.016 -0.010 -0.005 0.011
(0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.016)
age55 -0.011 -0.005 0.001 0.007
(0.026) (0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
age56 0.016 0.019 0.026 0.021
(0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
age57 -0.010 -0.002 0.006 0.010
(0.023) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012)
age58 -0.014 -0.003 0.007 -0.003 0.088
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.055)
age59 -0.027 -0.034* -0.024 0.003 -0.114*
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.055)
age60 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.012 -0.015
(0.022) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.050)
age61 -0.029 -0.006 0.012 0.001 0.091
(0.023) (0.016) (0.016) (0.013) (0.052)
age62 -0.035 -0.037* -0.005 -0.002 -0.079
(0.026) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.046)
age63 -0.045 -0.033 -0.014 0.014 -0.036
(0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.017) (0.048)
age64 -0.080* -0.037 -0.014 -0.024 0.022
(0.033) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.052)
age65 0.009 -0.006 0.020 0.014 0.050
(0.036) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.041)
age66 -0.092* -0.053 -0.036 -0.007 -0.058
(0.040) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.039)
age67 0.017 -0.005 0.017 -0.044 0.052
(0.041) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.040)
age68 -0.057 -0.059 -0.034 0.004 -0.078
(0.046) (0.038) (0.037) (0.041) (0.045)
age69 0.006 0.041 0.036 -0.007 0.065
(0.054) (0.044) (0.043) (0.039) (0.058)
individual-year obs. 10,028 9,537 9,537 7,165 1,800
# of individuals 2,253 2,253 1,892 583
R2 0.208 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.02
Tests of Joint Signicance (p-value):
Age52-Age57 0.976 0.425 0.048 0.003
Age58-Age69 0.000 0.000 0.302 0.243 0.048
NOTE. - Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates signicance at 5%; ** indicates signicance at 1%.
All regressions include an intercept and a measure of the yearly unemployment rate. OLS regression includes
controls for marital status, education (dened as less than high school/high school/college) and race (dened as
black/hispanic/white). OLS standard errors clustered at the individual level. For xed-eects estimates, reported R2
is for the within regression. Dummies for ages 52 to 57 are eliminated from PT wage regression because of the low
number of observations available.
27Table 2: Age-Hours Prole from Dierent Specications
Dependent Variable
hoursit hoursit hoursit hoursFT
it hoursPT
it
OLS FE FE FE FE
PR=1 -0.595**
(0.022)
age52 -0.028 -0.025 -0.024 -0.016
(0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012)
age53 0.021 0.039 0.051** 0.004
(0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010)
age54 0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.005
(0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009)
age55 -0.007 -0.016 -0.005 -0.011
(0.011) (0.018) (0.016) (0.008)
age56 -0.019 -0.011 -0.000 -0.013
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007)
age57 -0.001 -0.005 0.010 0.001
(0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007)
age58 -0.017 -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.068
(0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.075)
age59 -0.001 -0.013 0.004 0.008 -0.042
(0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) (0.081)
age60 -0.017 -0.020 -0.012 -0.014* 0.037
(0.014) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) (0.064)
age61 -0.008 -0.028 0.006 0.001 -0.017
(0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) (0.066)
age62 -0.111** -0.093** -0.034 -0.020* -0.049
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.008) (0.061)
age63 -0.039 -0.072** -0.037 -0.001 -0.109
(0.028) (0.027) (0.022) (0.009) (0.063)
age64 -0.061 -0.048 -0.005 0.006 0.045
(0.036) (0.032) (0.027) (0.011) (0.061)
age65 -0.021 -0.043 0.006 -0.016 0.004
(0.039) (0.034) (0.029) (0.012) (0.057)
age66 -0.069 -0.053 -0.023 -0.016 0.005
(0.044) (0.037) (0.032) (0.016) (0.054)
age67 0.023 0.018 0.059 0.016 0.077
(0.045) (0.039) (0.034) (0.019) (0.056)
age68 -0.096* -0.083* -0.037 -0.036 -0.127*
(0.047) (0.042) (0.038) (0.020) (0.062)
age69 -0.070 -0.075 -0.082 0.024 0.006
(0.064) (0.057) (0.052) (0.024) (0.081)
individual-year obs. 10,028 9,537 9,537 7,165 1,800
# of individuals 2,253 2,253 1,892 583
R2 0.12 0.17 0.37 0.02 0.02
Tests of Joint Signicance (p-value):
Age52-Age57 0.024 0.032 0.027 0.009
Age58-Age69 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042
NOTE. - Robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates signicance at 5%; ** indicates signicance at 1%.
All regressions include an intercept and a measure of the yearly unemployment rate. OLS regression includes
controls for marital status, education (dened as less than high school/high school/college) and race (dened as
black/hispanic/white). OLS standard errors clustered at the individual level. For xed-eects estimates, reported R2
is for the within regression. Dummies for ages 52 to 57 are eliminated from PT wage regression because of the low
number of observations available.
28Table 3: First-stage results for dierent specications. Marginal Eects. (Continued on next page)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Retired Retired Retired. PT Fully Ret.
Time-Varying Regressors
age




































health limit 0.138** 0.139** -0.061** 0.194**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
current wealth
a (in 100k) 0.014** 0.011* 0.017**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Table continued on next page.
29Table 3: First-stage results for dierent specications. Marginal Eects. (Cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)





a (in 100k) 0.014**
(0.004)
over ERA 0.128** 0.017 0.110**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.012)




a -0.014** -0.015** -0.017** -0.020** -0.017**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
avg. health limit 0.130** 0.145** 0.144** 0.083* 0.189**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033) (0.021)
avg. wealth
a (in 100k) 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
education = college 0.027 -0.006 -0.005 0.050** -0.054**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
education = high school 0.019 0.007 0.007 0.023 -0.015
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
mother's education 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.053** 0.177**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.010)
pension type = DB -0.056** -0.067** -0.069** -0.097** 0.028*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
pension type = DC -0.093** -0.103** -0.105** -0.052** -0.054**
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
Obs. 16,450 16,353 16,353 16,353 16,353
NOTE. - Marginal eects reported. Standard errors obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications clustered at the individual
level to account for the panel structure of the data. * indicates signicance at 5%; ** indicates signicance at 1%. All
regressions include an intercept and a measure of the yearly unemployment rate. Top 0.5% of observations from wealth
distribution are dropped from specications where wealth appears as regressor.
a Marginal eects of age, average age, wealth, and average wealth obtained from a regression including a quadratic polynomial
on the corresponding variable (coecients from this regression shown in table A.1 in the table appendix).
30Table 4: Wage-Regression Equation.






age52 0.035 0.035 0.034
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024)
age53 0.008 0.006 0.002
(0.021) (0.020) (0.022)
age54 0.017 0.015 0.009
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
age55 0.010 0.009 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
age56 0.023 0.023 0.020
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
age57 0.013 0.012 0.009
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
age58 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
age59 0.008 0.006 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
age60 0.013 0.012 0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
age61 0.007 0.006 0.000
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
age62 0.006 0.004 -0.005
(0.018) (0.017) (0.031)
age63 0.017 0.016 0.013
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
age64 -0.021 -0.022 -0.024
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
age65 0.017 0.015 0.012
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
age66 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
age67 -0.044 -0.046 -0.045
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036)
age68 0.007 0.006 0.003
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041)




wealth (in 100k) 0.003
(0.006)
wealth (in 100k) squared -0.000
(0.000)








individual-year obs. 7,165 R 7,165 R 7,165 R 7,165
# of individuals 1,892 1,892 1,892 1,892
NOTE. - Standard errors (in parentheses) obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications
clustered at the individual level to account for panel structure of the data. The rst
and second stages are bootstrapped jointly, to obtain consistent estimates of the stan-
dard errors on inverse Mills ratios in the second stage. * indicates signicance at 5%;
**indicates signicance at 1%; 31Table 5: Reasons left last employer (in percentage points)
i not retired in t   1 i retired
in t   1
i fully retired i partially i not retired career
in t retired in t in t
Business closed 5.09 4.41 18.85 5.66
Laid o/let go 9.96 12.06 23.84 11.21
Poor health/disabled 16.08 3.82 2.03 14.34
Family care 0.81 1.18 0.55 1.21
Better job 0.81 8.24 20.70 4.95
Quit 3.10 10.00 13.86 11.31
Retireda 61.73 54.71 14.23 38.79
Family moved 0.15 0.59 1.48 0.91
Sold (own) business 0.22 0.00 0.18 0.71
Divorce/Separation 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
Handed over responsibilities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
to other family members
Transportation; distance to work 0.00 0.29 0.74 0.30
To travel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20
Early retirement incentive 0.52 0.59 0.37 0.30
Financially advantageous 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.30
not to work
Respondent or spouse 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00
was transferred
Other 1.40 4.12 2.95 9.60
Obs. 1,356 340 541 990
a See table 6 for disaggregated reasons for retirement.
NOTE: Not all individuals who are asked about the reasons why the left their last employer give an answer. The proportions
in the table have been computed using nonmissing responses only.
32Table 6: Reasons for retirement (in percentage points)
i not retired in t   1 i retired
in t   1
i fully retired i partially i not retired career
in t retired in t in t
No change in employment situation 80.02 74.59 76.62 82.46
Wages reduced 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.29
Hours reduced 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.88
Would have been laid o 0.61 2.70 2.59 0.88
Supervisor/co-workers encouraged departure 1.36 1.62 1.29 1.17
New job duties/location 2.10 1.62 0.00 2.34
Became eligible for pension/ nancial incentive 5.17 8.64 7.79 3.80
Didn't get along/unsafe working conditions 6.28 7.02 7.79 4.38
Physical condition/stress 0.74 0.54 2.59 0.71
Other 3.11 3.27 1.33 2.51
Obs. 811 185 77 342
33Table Appendix
Table A.1: Coecient from rst-stage regressions. (Continued on next page)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
R R R PR FR
Time-Varying Regressors
age -0.113 -0.109 -0.095
(0.119) (0.179) (0.173)




































health limit 0.608** 0.612** 0.287** 1.034**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.074) (0.064)
current wealth (in 100k) 0.073** 0.063** 0.119**
(0.016) (0.023) (0.024)
current wealth (in 100k) squared -0.002 -0.001 -0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Table continued on next page.
34Table A.1: Coecients from rst-stage regressions. (Cont.)
(1) (2) (3) (4)




current wealth (in 100k) 0.074**
(0.016)
current wealth (in 100k) squared -0.002*
(0.001)
over ERA 0.490** 0.496** 0.733**
(0.046) (0.072) (0.068)
over FRA 0.169** 0.223* 0.222*
(0.062) (0.093) (0.087)
Time-Constant Regressors
avg. age -0.067** -0.073** 0.494** 1.245** 0.295
(0.006) (0.006) (0.173) (0.283) (0.265)
avg. age squared -0.005** -0.011** -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
avg. health limit 0.558** 0.645** 0.642** 0.390** 1.104**
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.112) (0.098)
avg. wealth (in 100k) 0.030* 0.031* 0.042* 0.036
(0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.019)
avg. wealth (in 100k) squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
education = college 0.110** -0.052 -0.046 0.153* -0.197**
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.059) (0.055)
education = high school 0.074* 0.012 0.015 0.097 -0.024
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.056) (0.050)
mother's education 0.011 -0.012 -0.013 0.042* -0.054**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019)
pension type = DB -0.183** -0.238** -0.244** -0.565** -0.155**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.054) (0.050)
pension type = DC -0.378** -0.436** -0.443** -0.609** -0.565**
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.057) (0.054)
Obs. 16,136 16,040 16,040 16,040 16,040
NOTE. - Marginal eects reported. Standard errors obtained from 1,000 bootstrap replications for probit regressions and 250
replications for multinomial probit regression. * indicates signicance at 5%; ** indicates signicance at 1%. All regressions
include an intercept and a measure of the yearly unemployment rate. Top 0.5% of observations from wealth distribution are
dropped from specications where wealth appears as regressor.
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